"We got the forensics from the pros that they hired which - again, best practice is always to get access to the machines themselves, but this my folks tell me was an appropriate substitute," Comey said. In his testimony in January on the cyber attacks, then-director of the FBI James Comey said the agency never got access to the machines themselves, but obtained access to the forensics from a review of the system performed by CrowdStrike, a third-party cybersecurity firm. Getting someone's corporate credentials gives thieves a lot more access than stealing one database.What about all of the contact with the Clinton campaign and the Russians? Also, is it true that the DNC would not let the FBI in to look?- Donald J.
#Criminalizing information from the dnc server password
If anyone ever comes up with an easy way to break this, then everyone's going to be in for a round of password changes and free credit monitoring. Even if the provider has no idea what your password is, a hash of it is being stored somewhere.otherwise you wouldn't be able to authenticate. OAuth and the like set up a very strong environment, but it's still just an identity database under the hood. Anyone using Office 365 in an organization likely has their credentials synchronized up to Azure AD, for example, so they can use the web apps like Outlook and Skype. In the Microsoft, Google and Amazon iterations of this (MS account, Azure AD, Google Account, Amazon Identity Management,) companies are using third parties to handle authentication to their resources (at least on the web.) This means that the identities are slowly being consolidated to a few providers on the corporate side. In the new cloudy world of abstracted everything, companies are finding it easier to rely on a few identity providers."log in using Facebook" and the like. If I were a thief, the thing I'd try attacking is the increasing use of federated identity, and hit those targets with everything I had.social engineering, zero-days, finding soft spots where cut-rate consulting firms left the door open, the works. I think we'll see a major shift in information security when the insurance companies get more involved, requiring companies they insure to follow certain standards. (Just like installing monitored fire and burglary alarms reduces the cost of your homeowners insurance). The cost of the insurance, which shows up on the balance sheet, is based on the risk-reduction methods that the insured uses. They hold companies responsible for properly mitigating all kinds of risks, as a condition of issuing insurance. Insurance companies created the fire code, UL labs, etc to reduce the risk of fire. Risk assessment and risk reduction is their business and they've gotten quite good at it. On the other hand, insurance companies are very good at it. People, including executives, aren't good at reasoning about unlikely events. The issue is, the likelihood of a major breach is low (for each conpany). A lot of companies have a Chief Security Officer now, a C-suite executive responsible for security. The average cost to a company that's breached is already well over $1 per record, so no that doesn't "quickly remedy this problem".
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